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ABSTRACT
Recent work on stealing machine learning (ML) models from infer-
ence engines with physical side-channel attacks warrant an urgent
need for effective side-channel defenses. This work proposes the
first fully-masked neural network inference engine design.
Masking uses secure multi-party computation to split the secrets
into random shares and to decorrelate the statistical relation of
secret-dependent computations to side-channels (e.g., the power
draw). In this work, we construct secure hardware primitives to
mask all the linear and non-linear operations in a neural network.
We address the challenge of masking integer addition by convert-
ing each addition into a sequence of XOR and AND gates and by
augmenting Trichina’s secure Boolean masking style. We improve
the traditional Trichina’s AND gates by adding pipelining elements
for better glitch-resistance and we architect the whole design to
sustain a throughput of 1 masked addition per cycle.
We implement the proposed secure inference engine on a Xil-
inx Spartan-6 (XC6SLX75) FPGA. The results show that masking
incurs an overhead of 3.5% in latency and 5.9× in area. Finally, we
demonstrate the security of the masked design with 2M traces.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Physical side-channel attacks pose a major threat to the secu-
rity of cryptographic devices. Attacks like the Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) [26] can extract secret keys by exploiting the in-
herent correlation between the secret-key-dependent data being
processed and the Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
(CMOS) power consumption [9]. DPA has been shown to be ef-
fective against many cryptographic implementations in the last
two decades [7, 16, 50]. Until recently, these attacks were confined
to cryptographic schemes. But lately, the Machine Learning (ML)
applications are shown to be vulnerable to physical side-channel
attacks [13, 20, 76], where an adversary aims to reverse engineer
the ML model. Indeed, these models are lucrative targets as they are
costly to develop and hence become valuable IPs for the companies
[65]. Knowledge about model parameters also makes it easy to fool
the model using adversarial learning, which is a serious problem if
the model performs a critical task like fraud/spam detection [48].
Unfortunately, most of the existing work on the physical side-
channel analysis of ML accelerators has focused only on attacks,
not defenses. To date, there are three publications focusing specif-
ically on the power/EM side-channel leakage of ML models. The
first two discuss some countermeasures like shuffling and masking
but do not implement any [20, 76]. The third one implements a
hybrid of masking and hiding based countermeasures and exposes
the vulnerability in the arithmetic masking of integers due to the
leakage in the sign-bit [13].
Masking uses secure multi-party computation to split the secrets
into random shares and to decorrelate the statistical relation of
secret-dependent computations to side-channels. Although similar
work on cryptographic hardware has been fully masked [3], the
earlier work on neural network hardware was partially masked for
cost-effectiveness [13] while the leakage in the sign bit is hidden.
Such solutions may work well for a regular IP where reasonable
security at low-cost is sufficient. However, full masking is a better
alternative for IPs deployed in critical applications (like defense)
requiring stronger defenses against side-channel attacks.
In this work, we propose the design of the first fully-masked neu-
ral network accelerator resistant against power-based side-channel
attacks. We construct novel masked primitives for the various lin-
ear and non-linear operations in a neural network using gate-level
Boolean masking and masked look-up tables (LUT). We analyze
neural network-specific computations like weighted summations
in fully-connected layers and build specialized masked adders and
multiplexers to perform those operations in a secure way. We also
design a novel hardware that finds the greatest integer out of a set
of integers in a masked fashion, which is needed in the output layer
to find the node with the highest confidence score.
We target an area-optimized Binarized Neural Network (BNN)
in our work because of their preference for edge-based neural
network inference [57, 71]. We optimize the hardware design to
reduce the impact of masking on the performance. Specifically, we
build an innovative adder-accumulator architecture that provides
a throughput of one addition per cycle even with a multi-cycle
masked adder with feedback. We maximize the number of balanced
data-paths in the masking elements by adding registers at every
stage, to synchronize the arrival of signals and reduce the effects
of glitches [29]. We build the masked design in a modular fashion
starting from smaller blocks like Trichina’s AND gates to finally
build larger structures like the 20-bit masked full adder. We have
pipelined the full design to maintain a high throughput.
Finally, we implement both the baseline unmasked and the pro-
posed first-order secure masked neural network design on an FPGA.
We use the standard TVLA methodology [2] to evaluate the first-
order security of the design and demonstrate no leakage up to 2M
traces. The latency of the masked implementation is merely 3.5%
higher than the latency of the unmasked implementation. The area
of the masked design is 5.9× that of the unmasked design. Our goal
in this paper is to provide the first fully-masked design where we
propose certain optimizations and a practical evaluation of security.
We also discuss potential further optimizations and extensions of
masking for hardware design and security refinements.
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Figure 1: Standard DPA threat model applied to ML model
stealing, where the trained neural network is deployed to
an edge device running in an untrusted environment.
2 THREAT MODEL
We adopt the standard DPA threat model in which an adversary has
direct physical access to the target device running inference [13,
20, 45], or can obtain power measurements remotely [78] when the
device executes neural network computations. The adversary can
control the inputs and observe the corresponding outputs from the
device as in chosen-plaintext attacks. Figure 1 shows our threat
model where the training phase is trusted but the trained model is
then deployed to an inference engine that operates in an untrusted
environment. The adversary is after the trained model parameters
(e.g., weights and biases of a neural network)—input data privacy
is out of scope [72].
We assume that the trained ML model is stored in a protected
memory and the standard techniques are used to securely transfer
it (i.e., bus snooping attacks are out of scope) [27]. The adversary,
therefore, has gray-box access to the device, i.e., it knows all the
design details up to the level of each individual logic gate but does
not know the trained ML model. We restrict the secret variables
to just the parameters and not the hyperparameters such as the
number of neurons, following earlier work [13, 43, 69]. In fact, an
adversary will still not be able to clone the model with just the hy-
perparameters if it does not possess the required compute power or
training dataset. This is analogous to the scenario in cryptography
where an adversary, even after knowing the implementation of a
cipher, cannot break it without the correct key.
We target a hardware implementation of the neural network, not
software. The design fully fits on the FPGA. Therefore, it does not
involve any off-chip memory access and executes with constant-
flow in constant time. These attributes make the design resilient
to any type of digital (memory, timing, access-pattern ,etc.) side-
channel attack. However, the physical side-channels like power
and EM emanations still exist; we address the power-based side-
channel leakages in our work. Other implementation attacks on
neural networks such as the fault attacks [4, 5] are out of scope.
3 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
This section presents related work on the privacy of ML applica-
tions, the current state of side-channel defenses, preliminaries on
BNNs, and our BNN hardware design.
3.1 ML Model Extraction
Recent developments in the field of ML point to several motivating
scenarios that demand asset confidentiality. Firstly, training is a
computationally-intensive process and hence requires the model
provider to invest money on high-performance compute resources
(eg. a GPU cluster). The model provider might also need to invest
money to buy a labeled dataset for training or label an unstruc-
tured dataset. Therefore, knowledge about either the parameters
or hyperparameters can provide an unfair business advantage to
the user of the model, which is why the ML model should be pri-
vate. Theoretical model extraction analyzes the query-response
pair obtained by repeatedly querying an unknown ML model to
steal the parameters [22, 24, 55, 58]. This type of attack is similar to
the class of theoretical cryptanalysis in the cryptography literature.
Digital side-channels, by contrast, exploit the leakage of secret-
data dependent intermediate computations like access-patterns or
timing in the neural network computations to steal the parame-
ters [11, 14, 33, 75], which can usually be mitigated by making
the secret computations constant-flow and constant-time. Phys-
ical side-channels target the leak in the physical properties like
CMOS power-draw or electromagnetic emanations that will still
exist in a constant-flow/constant-time algorithm’s implementation
[13, 20, 39, 72, 73]. Mitigating physical side-channels are thus harder
than digital side-channels in hardware accelerator design and has
been extensively studied in the cryptography community.
3.2 Side-Channel Defenses
The researchers have proposed numerous countermeasures against
DPA. These countermeasures can be broadly classified as either
hiding-based ormasking-based. The former aims to make the power-
consumption constant throughout the computation by using power-
balancing techniques [53, 67, 77]. The latter splits the sensitive vari-
able into multiple statistically independent shares to ensure that
the power consumption is independent of the sensitive variable
throughout the computation [3, 23, 34, 36, 56, 70]. The security
provided by hiding-based schemes hinges upon the precision of
the back-end design tools to create a near-perfect power-equalized
circuit by balancing the load capacitances across the leakage prone
paths. This is not a trivial task and prior literature shows how a
well-balanced dual-rail based defense is still vulnerable to localized
EM attacks [40]. By contrast, masking transforms the algorithm
itself to work in a secure way by never evaluating the secret vari-
ables directly, keeping the security mostly independent of back-end
design and making it a favorable choice over hiding.
3.3 Neural Network Classifiers
Neural network algorithms learn how to perform a certain task. In
the learning phase, the user sends a set of inputs and expected out-
puts to the machine (a.k.a., training), which helps it to approximate
(or learn) the function mapping the input-output pairs. The learned
function can then be used by the machine to generate outputs for
unknown inputs (a.k.a., inference).
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Figure 2: A typical Binarized Neural Networkwhere the neu-
ron performs weighted summations on binarized weights,
and the activation function is a sign function.
A neural network consists of units called neurons (or nodes) and
these neurons are usually grouped into layers. The neurons in each
layer can be connected to the neurons in the previous and next
layers. Each connection has a weight associated with it, which is
computed as part of the training process. The neurons in a neural
network work in a feed-forward fashion passing information from
one layer to the next.
The weights and biases can be initialized to be random values or
a carefully chosen set before training [28]. These weights and biases
are the critical parameters that our countermeasure aims to protect.
During training, a set of inputs along with the corresponding labels
are fed to the network. The network computes the error between
the actual outputs and the labels and tunes the weights and biases
to reduce it, converging to a state where the accuracy is acceptable.
3.4 Binarized Neural Networks
The weights and biases of a neural network are typically floating-
point numbers. However, high area, storage costs, and power de-
mands of floating-point hardware do not fare well with the re-
quirements of the resource-constrained edge devices. Fortunately,
Binarized Neural Networks (BNNs) [8], with their low hardware
cost and power needs fit very well in this use-case while providing
a reasonable accuracy. BNNs restrict the weights and activation
to binary values (+1 and -1), which can easily be represented in
hardware by a single bit. This significantly reduces the storage
costs for the weights from floating-point values to binary values.
The XNOR-POPCOUNT operation implemented using XNOR gates
replaces the large floating-point multipliers resulting in a huge area
and performance gain [57].
Figure 2 depicts the neuron computation in a fully-connected
BNN. The neuron in the first hidden layer multiplies the input
values with their respective binarized weights. The generated prod-
ucts are added to the bias, and the result is fed to the activation
function, which is a sign function that binarizes the non-negative
and negative inputs to +1 to -1, repectively. Hence, the activations
in the subsequent layer are also binarized.
3.5 Our Baseline BNN Hardware Design
We consider a BNN having an input layer of 784 nodes, 3 hidden
layers of 1010 nodes each, and an output layer of 10 nodes. The
784 input nodes denote the 784 pixel values in the 28×28 grayscale
Figure 3: A sequentialized hardware design of the baseline
BNN using a single adder.
Figure 4: Multiplier expressed as a multiplexer in BNNs.
images of the Modified National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (MNIST) database and 10 output nodes represent the 10 output
classes of the handwritten numerical digit. [8, 57, 71].
3.5.1 Weighted Summations. We choose to use a single adder in
the design and sequentialize all the additions in the algorithm to
reduce the area costs. Figure 3 shows our baseline BNN design. The
computation starts from the input layer pixel values stored in the
Pixel Memory. For each node of the first hidden layer, the hardware
multiplies 784 input pixel values one by one and accumulates the
sum of these products. The final summation is added with the bias
reusing the adder with a multiplexed input and fed to the activation
function. The hardware uses XNOR and POPCOUNT1 operations
to perform weighted summations in the hidden layers. The final
layer summations are sent to the output logic.
In the input layer computations, the hardware multiplies an 8-
bit unsigned input pixel value with its corresponding weight. The
weight values are binarized to either 0 or 1 (representing a -1 or +1,
respectively). Figure 4 shows the realization of this multiplication
with a multiplexer that takes in the pixel value (a) and its 2’s com-
plement (−a) as the data inputs and weight (±1) as the select line.
The 8-bit unsigned pixel value, when multiplied by ±1, needs to be
sign-extended to 9-bits, resulting in a 9-bit multiplexer.
3.5.2 Activation Function. The activation function binarizes the
non-negative and negative to +1 and -1 respectively for each node
of the hidden layer. In hardware, this is implemented using a simple
NOT gate that takes the MSB of the summations as its input.
3.5.3 Output Layer. The summations in the output layer represent
the confidence score of each output class for the provided image.
Therefore, the final classification result is the class having the maxi-
mum confidence score. Figure 3 shows the hardware for computing
1The POPCOUNT operation also involves an additional step of subtracting the number
of nodes (1010) from the final sum, which can be done as part of bias addition step.
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Figure 5: Trichina’s ANDGate implementation: glitch-prone
(left) and glitch-resistant (right). Flip-flops synchronize ar-
rival of signals at XOR gates’ inputs to mitigate glitches.
the classification result. As the adder generates output layer sum-
mations, they are sent to the output logic block that performs a
rolling update of the max register (max ) if the newly received sum
is greater than the previously computed max. In parallel, the hard-
ware also stores the index of the current max node. The index stored
after the final update is sent out as the final output of the neural
network. The hardware takes 2.8M cycles to finish one inference.
4 FULLY MASKING THE NEURAL NETWORK
This section discusses the hardware design and implementation
of all components in the masked neural network. Prior work on
masking of neural networks shows that arithmetic masking alone
cannot mask integer addition due to a leakage in the sign-bit [13].
Hence, we apply gate-level Boolean masking to perform integer
addition in a secure fashion. We express the entire computation of
the neural network as a sequence of AND and XOR operations and
apply gate-level masking on the resulting expression. XORs, being
linear, do not require any additional masking, and AND gates are
replaced with secure, Trichina style AND gates [70]. Furthermore,
we design specialized circuits for BNN’s unique components like
Masked Multiplexer and Masked Output Layer.
4.1 Notations
We first explain the notations in equations and figures. Any variable
without a subscript or superscript represents an N-bit number. We
use the subscript to refer to a single bit of the N-bit number. For
example, a7 refers to the 8th bit of a. The superscript in masking
refers to the different secret shares of a variable. To refer to a
particular share of a particular bit of an N-bit number, we use both
the subscript and the superscript. For example, a14 refers to the
second Boolean share of the 5th bit of a. If a variable only has the
superscript (say i), we are referring to its full N-bit ith Boolean
share; N can also be equal to 1, in which case a is simply a bit. r (or
ri ) denotes a fresh, random bit.
4.2 Why Trichina’s Masking Style?
Among the closely related masking styles [59], we chose to imple-
ment Trichina’s method due to its simplicity and implementation
efficiency. Figure 5 (left) shows the basic structure and functionality
of the Trichina’s gate, which implements a 2-bit, masked, AND
operation of c = a · b. Each input (a and b) is split into two shares
(a0 and a1 s.t. a = a0 ⊕ a1, and b0 and b1 s.t. b = b0 ⊕ b1). These
shares are sequentially processed with a chain of AND gates initi-
ated with a fresh random bit (r ). A single AND operation thus uses
3 random bits. The technique ensures that output is the Boolean
masked output of the original AND function, i.e., c = c0 ⊕ c1, while
all the intermediate computations are randomized.
Figure 6: Regular operation of a Full Adder (left) and its gate-
level masking using Trichina AND Gates (right).
Unfortunately, the straightforward adoption of Trichina’s AND
gate can lead to information leakage due to glitches [30]. For in-
stance, in Figure 5 (left) if the products a0 · b0 and a0 · b1 reach
the input of second XOR gate before random mask r reaches the
input of first XOR gate, the output at the XOR gate will evaluate
(glitch) to (a0 · b0) ⊕ (a0 · b1) = a0 · (b0 ⊕ b1) temporarily, which
leads to secret value b being unmasked. Therefore, we opted for
an extension of the Trichina’s AND gate by adding flip-flops to
synchronise the arrival of inputs at the XOR gates (see Figure 5
right). The only XOR gate not having a flip-flop at its input is the
leftmost XOR gate in the path of c1, which is not a problem be-
cause a glitching output at this gate does not combine two shares
of the same variable. Similar techniques have been used in past
[21]. Masking styles like the Threshold gates [19, 29, 49] may be
considered for even stronger security guarantees, but they will add
further area-performance-randomness overhead.
4.3 Masked Adder
We adopt the ripple-carry style of implementation for the adder. It
is formed using N 1-bit full adders where the carry-out from each
adder is the carry-in for the next adder in the chain, starting from
LSB. Therefore, ripple-carry configuration eases parameterization
and modular design of the Boolean masked adders.
4.3.1 Design of a Masked Full Adder. A 1-bit full adder takes as
input two operands and a carry-in and outputs the sum and the
carry, which are a function of the two operands and the carry-in. If
the input operand bits are denoted by a and b and carry-in bit by
c , then the Boolean equation of the sum S and the carry C can be
described as follows:
S = a ⊕ b ⊕ c (1)
C = a · b ⊕ b · c ⊕ c · a (2)
Figure 6 shows the regular, 1-bit full adder (on the left), and the
resulting masked adder with Trichina’s AND gates (on the right).
In the rest of the subsection, we will discuss the derivation of the
masked full adder equations.
First step is to split the secret variables (a, b and c) into Boolean
shares. The hardware samples a fresh, randommask from a uniform
distribution and performs XOR with the original variable. If we
represent the random masks as a0, b0 and c0, then the masked
values a1, b1 and c1 can be generated as follows:
a1 = a ⊕ a0, b1 = b ⊕ b0, c1 = c ⊕ c0 (3)
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Figure 7: Modular design of a masked 4-bit adder using
Masked Full Adders (top) and its pipelined version (bottom).
A masking scheme always works on the two shares independently
without ever combining them at any point in the operation. Com-
bining the shares at any point will reconstruct the secret and create
a side-channel leak at that point.
The function of sum-generation is linear, making it easy to di-
rectly and independently compute the Boolean shares of S :
S = S0 ⊕ S1
where,
S0 = a0 ⊕ b0 ⊕ c0, S1 = a1 ⊕ b1 ⊕ c1
Unlike the sum-generation, carry-generation is a non-linear oper-
ation due to the presence of an AND operator. Hence, the hardware
cannot directly and independently compute the Boolean shares
C0 and C1 of C . We use the Trichina’s construction explained in
subsection 4.2 to mask carry-generation.
The hardware uses three Trichina’s AND gates to mask the three
AND operations in equation (2) using three random masks. This
generates two Boolean shares from each Trichina AND operation.
At this point, the expression is linear again, and therefore, the
hardware can redistribute the terms, similar to the masking of
sum operation. In the following equations, we use TG(x ,y, r ) to
represent the product x · y implemented via Trichina’s AND Gate
as illustrated in the following equation:
x · y = TG(x ,y, r ) =m0 ⊕m1
wherem0 andm1 are the two Boolean shares of the product. Re-
placing each AND operation in equation (2) with TG, we can write
TG(a,b, r0) = d0 ⊕ d1 (4)
TG(b, c, r1) = e0 ⊕ e1 (5)
TG(c,a, r2) = f 0 ⊕ f 1 (6)
where d0, d1, e0, e1, f 0, and f 1 are the output shares from each
Trichina Gate. From equations (2), (4), (5), and (6) we get
carryout = TG(a,b, r0) ⊕ TG(b, c, r1) ⊕ TG(c,a, r2)
Figure 8: While the unmasked activation function (left) is
a single NOT gate, masked implementation (right) receives
two Boolean shares of MSB from masked adder and inverts
one of them.
Figure 9:Masking a regularmultiplexer using amasked LUT
taking a fresh random mask ri .
Replacing the TGs from equation (4), (5), and (6) and rearranging
the terms, we get
carryout = (d0 ⊕ e0 ⊕ f 0) ⊕ (d1 ⊕ e1 ⊕ f 1)
which can also be written as a combination of two Boolean shares
C0 and C1
carryout = C0 ⊕ C1
where
C0 = d0 ⊕ e0 ⊕ f 0, C1 = d1 ⊕ e1 ⊕ f 1
Therefore, we create a masked full adder that takes in the Boolean
shares of the two bits to be added along with a carry-in and gives
out the Boolean shares of the sum and carry-out.
4.3.2 TheModular Design of Pipelined N-bit Full Adder. Themasked
full adders can be chained together to create an N-bit masked adder
that can add two masked N-bit numbers. Figure 7 (top) shows how
to construct a 4-bit masked adder as an example. We pipeline the N-
bit adder to yield a throughput of one by adding registers between
the full-adders corresponding to each bit (see Figure 7 (bottom)).
4.4 Masking of Activation Function
The baseline hardware implements the activation function as an
inverter as discussed in 3.5.2. In the masked version, the MSB out-
put from the adder is a pair of Boolean shares. To perform NOT
operation in a masked way, the hardware simply inverts one of the
Boolean shares as Figure 8 shows.
4.5 Masked Multiplexer
A 9-bit multiplexer is internally a set of parallel nine 1-bit multiplex-
ers. We implement the masked 1-bit multiplexer using a 4-input
2-output masked look-up table (LUT). Figure 9 shows the masked
LUT that takes in the original inputs (a,−a) and an additional fresh
randommask (ri ) as inputs and outputs the randommask (ro ) which
is simply the bypassed ri and the correct output XORed with the
random mask. We assume that each LUT operation is atomic. Since
the output functions are 4-input, 2-output, they can be mapped onto
the same LUT of the target FPGA [74]. Lesser number of inputs also
obviate the need for precautions like building a carefully balanced
tree of smaller input LUTs [25]. Advanced masking constructions
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Figure 10: Masking of the Output Layer that uses a masked
subtractor and a masked multiplexer to find the node with
the maximum confidence score among the 10 output nodes.
can be used to implement this function for a stronger security guar-
antee. As suggested in another work [25], masked look-ups can
also be implemented using ROMs if the target is an ASIC, since
ROMs are immutable and small in size. Thus, the (Boolean) masked
output from the LUTs ensures that the secret intermediate-variable
(multiplexed input pixel) always remains masked.
4.6 Masking the Output Layer
The hardware stores the 10 output layer summations in the form
of Boolean shares. To determine the classification result, it needs
to find the maximum value among the 10 masked output nodes.
Specifically, it needs to compare two signed values expressed as
Boolean shares. We transform the problem of masked comparison
to masked subtraction.
Figure 10 shows the hardware design of the masked output layer.
The hardware subtracts each output node value from the current
maximum and swaps the current maximum (old max shares) with
the node value (new max shares) if the MSB is 1 using a masked
multiplexer. AnMSB of 1 signifies that the difference is negative and
hence the new sum is greater than the latest max. Instead of building
a new masked subtractor, we reuse the existing masked adder to
also function as a subtractor through a sub flag, which is set while
computing max. In parallel, the hardware uses one more masked
multiplexer-based update-circuit to update the Boolean shares of
the index corresponding to the current max node (not shown in
the Figure). This is to prevent known-ciphertext attacks, ciphertext
being the classification result in our case. Finally, theMaskedOutput
Logic computes the classification result in the form of (Boolean)
shares of the node’s index having the maximum confidence score.
Subtraction is essentially adding a number with the 2’s comple-
ment of another number. 2’s complement is computed by taking
bitwise 1’s complement and adding 1 to it. A bitwise 1’s comple-
ment is implemented as an XOR operation with 1 and the addition
of 1 is implemented by setting the initial carry-in to be equal to
1. Since this only requires additional XOR gates, which is a linear
operator, nothing changes with respect to the masking of the new
adder-subtractor circuit.
4.7 Scheduling of Operations
We optimize the scheduling in such a way that the hardware main-
tains a throughput of 1 addition per cycle. The latency of themasked
20-bit adder is 100 cycles. Therefore, the result from the adder will
only be available after 101 cycles (need an additional cycle for the
accumulator register as well) from the time it samples the inputs.
The hardware cannot feed the next input in the sequence until the
previous sum is available because of the data dependency between
Figure 11: Hardware Design of the Fully Masked Neural Net-
work. The components related tomasking are shown in dark
yellow. The register file helps in throughput optimization by
storing 101 summations parallelly.
the accumulated sum and the next accumulated sum. This incurs a
stall for 101 cycles leading to a total of 784 ∗ 101 = 79184 cycles for
each node computation. That is a 784× performance drop over the
unmasked implementation with a regular adder.
We solve the problem by finding useful work for the adder that
is independent of the summation in-flight, during the stalls. We
observe that computing the weighted summation of one node is
completely independent of the next node’s computation. The hard-
ware utilizes this independence to improve the throughput by start-
ing the next node computation while the result for the first node
arrives. Similarly, all the nodes up till 101 can be computed upon
concurrently using the same adder and achieve the exact same
throughput as the baseline design. This comes at the expense of
additional registers (see Figure 112) for storing 101 summations3
plus some control logic but a throughput gain of 784× (or 1010×
in hidden layers) is worthwhile. The optimization only works if
the number of next-layer nodes is greater than, and a multiple of
101. This restricts optimizing the output layer (of 10 nodes) and
contributes to the 3.5% increase in the latency of the masked design.
5 RESULTS
In this section, we describe the hardware setup used to implement
the neural network and capture power measurements, the leakage
assessment methodology that we follow to evaluate the security of
the proposed design, and the hardware implementation results.
5.1 Hardware Setup
We implement the neural network in Verilog and use Xilinx ISE 14.7
for synthesis and bitstream generation. We use the DONT_TOUCH
attribute in the code and disable the options like LUT combining,
register reordering, etc. in the tool to prevent any type of optimiza-
tion in the masked components.
Our side-channel evaluation platform is the SAKURA-G FPGA
board [18]. It hosts Xilinx Spartan-6 (XC6SLX75-2CSG484C) as
the main FPGA that executes the neural network inference. An
on-board amplifier amplifies the voltage drop across a 1Ω shunt
resistor on the power supply line. We use Picoscope 3206D [66] as
the oscilloscope to capture the measurements from the dedicated
SMA output port of the board. The design is clocked at 24MHz and
the sampling frequency of the oscilloscope is 125MHz. A higher
2The register file also has a demultiplexing and multiplexing logic to update and
consume the correct accumulated sum in sequence, which is not shown for simplicity.
3This is why we use 1010 neurons, which is a multiple of 101, in the hidden layers.
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Figure 12: TVLA results of the unmasked (left) and masked
(right) implementation. The results clearly show that the un-
masked design is insecure, whereas the masked design is se-
cure with 99.99% confidence (t-scores always below ±4.5).
Figure 13: First-order (left) and second-order (right) t-tests
on Trichina’s AND gate at a low design frequency of 1.5MHz
and sampling frequency of 500MHz.
sampling frequency leads to the challenges that we discuss in Sec-
tion 6.2. However, to ensure a sound evaluation, we perform first
and second-order t-tests on a smaller unit of the design at a much
higher precision: we conduct the experiment at a design frequency
of 1.5MHz and sampling frequency of 500MHz, which translates to
333 sample points per clock cycle.
We use Riscure’s Inspector SCA [61] software to communicate
with the board and initiate a capture on the oscilloscope. By default,
the Inspector software does not support SAKURA-G board com-
munication. Hence, we develop our own custom modules in the
software to automate the setup. The modules implement the FPGA
communication protocol and perform the register reads and writes
on the FPGA to start the neural network inference and capture the
classification result.
5.2 Leakage Evaluation
We perform the leakage assessment of the proposed design using
the non-specific fixed vs random t-tests, which is a common and
generic way of assessing the side-channel vulnerability in a given
implementation [2]. A t-score lying within the threshold range of
±4.5 implies that the power traces do not leak any information
about the data being processed, with up to 99.99% confidence. The
measurement and evaluation is quite involved and we refer the
reader to Section 6.2 for further details. We demonstrate the security
up to 2M traces, which is much greater than the first-order security
of the currently best-known defense that leaks at 40k traces [13].
Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNG) produce the fresh,
random masks required for masking. We choose TRIVIUM [10]
as the PRNG, which is a hardware implementation friendly PRNG
specified as an International Standard under ISO/IEC 29192-3, but
any cryptographically-secure PRNG can be employed. TRIVIUM
generates 264 bits of output from an 80-bit key; hence, the PRNG
has to be re-seeded before the output space is exhausted.
Table 1: Area (LUT/FF/BRAM) and Latency (in cycles) Com-
parison of the Unmasked and Masked Implementations.
Metric Unmasked Masked Change
Area 1833/1125/163 9833/7624/163 5.3× / 6.8× / 1×
Latency 2.85 × 106 2.94 × 106 1.04×
Table 2: Block-level Area Distribution of the Unmasked and
Masked Implementations (LUT/FF/BRAM)
Design Blocks Unmasked Masked Fraction(%)
Adder 10/0/0 954/1050/0 12/16/-
PRNGs 0/0/0 1125/1314/0 14/20/-
Output Layer 7/16/0 32/22/0 0.3/0.09/-
Throughput 0/20/0 5337/4040/0 66/62/-
Optimization
ROMs 411/1009/159 672/1009/159 4/-/-
RWMs 0/0/4 0/0/4 -
Misc 486/108/0 1233/2605/0 9/38/-
"-" denotes no change in the area of the unmasked and masked design.
5.2.1 First-order tests. We first perform the first-order t-test on the
design with PRNGs disabled, which is equivalent to an unmasked
(baseline/unprotected) design. Figure 12 (left) shows the result for
this experiment where we clearly observe significant leakages since
the t-scores are greater than the threshold of ±4.5 for the entire ex-
ecution. Then, we perform the same test, but with PRNGs switched
on this time, which is equivalent to a masked design. Figure 12
(right) shows the results for this case, where we observe that the
t-scores never cross the threshold of ±4.5 except the initial phase.
The initial phase leakages are due to the input correlations during
input layer computations. The hardware loads the input pixel after
every 101 cycles and feeds it to the masked multiplexer. The secret
variable is the weight, which is never exposed because the masked
multiplexer randomises the output using a fresh, random mask.
5.2.2 High Precision First and Second-order tests. We performed
univariate second-order t-test on the fully masked design [64], but
1M traces were not sufficient to reveal the leakages. Due to the
extremely lengthy measurement and evaluation times it was infea-
sible to continue the test for more number of traces. Therefore, we
perform first and second-order evaluation on the isolated synchro-
nized Trichina’s AND gate, which is one of the main building blocks
of the full design. We reduce the design frequency to 1.5MHz to
increase the accuracy of the measurement and prevent any aliasing
between clock cycles. The SNR for a single gate was not sufficient
to see leakage even at 10M traces, hence we amplify the SNR by
instantiating 32 independent instances of the Trichina’s AND gate
in the design, driven by the same inputs. We present the results for
this experiment in Figure 13 that shows no leakage in the first-order
t-test but significant leakages in the second-order t-tests for 500k
traces. Thus, by ensuring success in the second-order t-tests we val-
idate the correctness of our measurement setup and the first-order
masking implementation.
5.3 Masking Overheads
Table 1 shows that the impact of masking on the performance
is 1.04×, and on the number of LUTs and FFs is 5.3× and 6.7×
respectively. We also summarize the area contribution from each
design component in Table 2. The fourth column indicates what
fraction of the total increase in area (i.e., 8000 LUTs and 6499 FFs)
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does each component contribute. Most of the area increase is due
to the throughput optimization logic—the register file accumulator
logic described in subsection 4.7. The masked adder contributes 12%
and 16% to the overall increase in the LUTs and FFs respectively.
The increase due to the output layer logic is minimal. ROMs refer to
the read-only memories storing the weights and bias values where
the increase is minimal4. RWMs refer to the read-write memories
storing the layer activations, which also do not show any increase
as the masked version stores two bits (the Boolean shares) instead
of one for the activations accommodated in the same BRAM tile.
We compare the area-delay product (ADP) of our proposed de-
sign, BoMaNet, to MaskedNet [13], where area is defined as the sum
of the number of LUTs and FFs, and delay is defined as the latency
in number of cycles. The ADP of our design is 5 × 1010 whereas
the ADP of MaskedNET is 6.4 × 108, which is approximately 100×
lower. This is expected since MaskedNet was designed for cost-
effectiveness using hiding and partial masking, but on BoMaNet
every operation is masked at the gate-level to improve side-channel
security. Similar overheads were observed in previous works on
Boolean masking of AES [35].
6 DISCUSSIONS
6.1 Proof-of-Concept vs. Optimizations
The solution we propose utilizes simple yet effective techniques
to mask an inference engine. But certainly, there is scope for im-
provement both in terms of the hardware design and the security
countermeasures. In this section, we discuss some possible opti-
mizations/extensions of our work and alternate approaches taken
in the field of privacy for ML.
6.1.1 Design Optimizations. The ripple-carry adder used in this
work can be replaced with advanced adder architectures like carry-
lookahead [12], carry-skip [47], or Kogge-Stone [46]. These architec-
tures commonly possess an additional logic block that pre-computes
the generate and propagate bits. Therefore, additional randomness
will be needed to mask the non-linear generate expression. All these
adders have more combinational logic than the ripple-carry adder,
which may make it harder to avoid glitches. To that end, prior work
on TI-based secure versions of ripple-carry and Kogge-Stone adders
can be extended [63]. Another potential optimization is the use of
other masking styles like DoM [37] or manual techniques [15] to
reduce the area and randomness overheads.
6.1.2 Limitations. We reduce glitch-related vulnerabilities using
registers at each stage, which is a low-cost, practical solution. Other
works have proposed stronger countermeasures, at the cost of
higher performance and area overheads [30, 37]. The quest for
stronger and more efficient countermeasures is never-ending; mask-
ing of AES is still being explored, even 20 years after the initial
work [23], due to the advent of more efficient or secure masking
schemes [31] and more potent attacks [52, 70].
Our solution is first-order secure but there is scope for con-
struction of higher-order masked versions. However, higher-order
security is a delicate task;Moos et al. recently showed that a straight-
forward extension of masking schemes to higher-order suffers from
4The slight increase in the number of LUTs is because one of the memories is imple-
mented using LUTs that might redistribute even for the same memory size.
both local and compositional flaws [32] and masking extensions
were proposed in another recent work [17].
This is the first work on fully-masked neural networks and we
foresee follow ups as we have experienced in the cryptographic
research of AES masking, even after 20 years of intensive study.
6.2 Measurement Challenges
We faced some unique challenges that are not generally seen with
the symmetric-key cryptographic evaluations. Inference becomes
a lengthy operation, especially for an area-optimized design—the
inference latency of our design is roughly 3 million cycles. For
a design frequency of 24MHz, the execution time translates to
122ms per inference. If the oscilloscope samples at 125MHz (sample
interval of 8ns) the number of sample points to be captured per
power trace is equal to 15 million. This significantly slows down the
capturing of power traces. In our case, capturing 2 million power
traces took one week, which means capturing 100 million traces as
AES evaluation [31] will take roughly a year. Performing TVLA on
such large traces ( 28TB, in our case) also takes a significant amount
of time: it took 3 days to get one t-score plot during our evaluations
on a high-end PC5. One possibility to avoid this problem is looking
at a small subset of representative traces of the computation [6],
but, we instead conduct a comprehensive evaluation of our design.
6.3 Theoretical vs Side-Channel Attacks
Theoretical model extraction by training a proxymodel on a synthet-
ically generated dataset using the predictions from the unknown
victim model is an active area of research [22, 24]. These attacks
mostly assume a black-box access to the model and successfully
extract the model parameters after a certain number of queries.
This number ranges typically in the order of 220 [24]. By contrast,
physical side-channel attacks only require a few thousand queries
to successfully steal all the parameters [13]. This is partly due to fact
that physical side-channel attacks can extract information about
intermediate computations even in a black-box setting. Physical
side-channel attacks also do not require the generation of the syn-
thetic dataset, unlike most theoretical attacks.
6.4 Orthogonal ML Defences
There has been some work on defending the ML models against
stealing of inputs and parameters using other techniques like Ho-
momorphic Encryption (HE) and Secure Multi-Party Computation
(SMPC) [44, 51, 60], Watermarking [1, 62], and Trusted Execution
Engines (TEE) [38, 42, 68]. The survey by Isakov et al. and the draft
by NIST is a good reference for a more exhaustive list [41, 54].
The computational needs of HE might not be suitable for edge
computing. The current SMPC defenses predominantly target a
cloud-based ML framework, not edge. We propose masking, which
is an extension of SMPC on hardware and we believe that it is a
promising direction for ML side-channel defenses as it has been on
cryptographic applications. Watermarking techniques are punitive
methods that cannot prevent physical side-channel attacks. TEEs
are subject to ever-evolvingmicroarchitectural attacks and typically
are not available in edge/IoT nodes.
5Intel Core i9-9900K, 64GB RAM.
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
Physical side-channel analysis of neural networks is a new, promis-
ing direction in hardware security where the attacks are rapidly
evolving compared to defenses. This work proposed the first fully-
masked neural network, demonstrated the security with up to 2M
traces, and quantified the overheads of a potential countermeasure.
We have addressed the key challenge of masking arithmetic shares
of integer addition [13] through Boolean masking. We furthermore
presented ideas on how to mask the unique linear and non-linear
computations of a fully-connected neural network that do not exist
in cryptographic applications.
The large variety in neural network architectures in terms of
the level of quantization, the types of layer operations (e.g., Con-
volution, Maxpool, Softmax), and the types of activation functions
(e.g., ReLU, Sigmoid, Tanh) presents a large design space for neural
network side-channel defenses. This paper focused on BNNs as
they are a good starting point. The ideas presented in this work
serve as a benchmark to analyze the vulnerabilities that exist in
neural network computations and to construct more robust and
efficient countermeasures.
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